Western New England Law Review
Volume 25 25 (2003)
Issue 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW SYMPOSIUM –
THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION

Article 1

1-1-2003

BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND
SUPERFUND REFORM UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION: A REFRESHING
BIPARTISAN ACCOMPLISHMENT
Melissa H. Weresh

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Melissa H. Weresh, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND SUPERFUND REFORM UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION: A REFRESHING BIPARTISAN ACCOMPLISHMENT, 25 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 193 (2003),
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss2/1

This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New
England University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Volume 25
Issue 2
2003

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND
LAW REVIEW

BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND
SUPERFUND REFORM UNDER THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION: A REFRESHING
BIPARTISAN ACCOMPLISHMENT
MELISSA

H.

WERESH 1

INTRODUCTION

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
has defined brownfields as "abandoned, idled or underused indus
trial and commercial sites where expansion and redevelopment is
complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination that
can add cost, time or uncertainty to a redevelopment project."2
The United States Office of Technology Assessment includes in the
brownfields definition sites whose "redevelopment may be hin
dered not only by potential contamination, but also by poor loca
tion, old or obsolete infrastructure, or other less tangible factors
often linked to neighborhood decline."3 The greatest concentration
of such sites is in urban centers, where former industrial practices or
1. Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Drake University Law School. The au
thor would like to thank Drake University Law School for its generous assistance with
this project. The author would also like to thank research assistant Amy Duin-Ratciiff
for her marvelous research skills and Nichole Biglin and Lindsey Moore for their assis
tance with citation format. Responsibility for any errors that remain is my own.
2. TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 5 (A.B.A. Section of Natural
Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. 1997) [hereinafter COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE] (citing U.S.
ENVT. PROT. AGENCY 5, OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS, BASIC BROWNFIELDS FACT SHEET

(1996».
3.

COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 5 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNICAL
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waste disposal activities resulted in contamination. However,
brownfields exist in-rural areas as well. It is estimated that 150,000
to 650,000 brownfields sites exist, and these estimates likely fail to
account for many sites at which the existence of contamination has
not been investigated. 4
Many brownfields sites were abandoned as a result of deindus
trialization trends. s Barriers to redevelopment of these sites in
clude the uncertainty regarding costs associated with cleanup,
insufficient financing for such costs, ambiguous federal, state and
local policies regarding redevelopment, absence of a comprehensive
redevelopment framework, and competition from pristine, or
"greenfield" sites. 6 Clearly, fear of environmental contamination
and liability associated with such contamination has been a major
factor hindering redevelopment.
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Ace (CERCLA or Superfund) is widely considered to
be a major contributor to the brownfields problem.8 CERCLA cre
ates a massive statutory net of liability for current and former ownASSESSMENT, STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND
REDEVELOPMENT OF CONTAMINATED SITES 8 (1995».
4. BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACflCE, § 1.02 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2001)
[hereinafter BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACflCE] (noting that a range of 150,000 to
450,000 brownfields sites can be attributed to both the varying definitions of
brownfields and the reality that many sites have not been investigated). See also MARK
S. DENNISON, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES FOR
REHABILITING CONTAMINATED REAL ESTATE (1998) (recognizing that the City of Chi
cago has noted over 2000 brownfields in the metropolitan area and that the U.S. Gov
ernment Accounting Office estimates as many as 650,000 brownfields across the United
States).
5. See BROWNFIELDS LAW AND PRACflCE, supra note 4, at § 1.03 (noting that
initial disinvestment decisions related to demographic changes resulted in brownfields
and that such decisions were wholly unrelated to environmental considerations).
6. See generally COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 9 (outlining various
barriers to redevelopment of brownfields).
7. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.c. §§ 9601-75 (2002).
8. It should be noted that CERCLA is not the only source of perceived environ
mental liability affecting the decision to redevelop brownfields. Other federal environ
mental laws, including the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, and the Clean Air Act potentially impose liability on the owner of brownfields for
existing contamination. Also, many states have enacted statutory programs which mir
ror CERCLA and therefore provide a basis for liability which creates a disincentive for
brownfields redevelopment. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Learning From
Brownfields, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 217,220-27 (1998) (discussing the role
of federal environmental laws in creating the brownfields problems); John S. Apple
gate, Risk Assessment, Redevelopment, and Environmental Justice: Evaluating the
Brownfields Bargain, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 243 (1998).
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ers of contaminated property as well as parties which contributed to
the contamination. 9 Liability also can extend to lenders where they
are involved in the operation of a facility,l° Liability under the stat
ute is strict, joint, and several,ll and the costs associated with assess
ing and responding to contamination at Superfund sites is
staggering. Consequently, fear of liability under CERCLA for
ownership of or control over a Superfund site is a significant.deter
rent in brownfields redevelopment. 12
Conversely, many brownfields sites have enormous redevelop
ment potential because of their proximity to existing infrastructure
and because the existence (or perceived existence) of contamina
tion decreases the price of the property. Because these sites are
abandoned or underutilized, they create a blight on the community.
Once developed, they have the potential to contribute to the sur
rounding community and economy. Tax revenues and employment
opportunities are significant benefits associated with brownfields
redevelopment. Also, redevelopment of existing industrial sites, as
opposed to developing open, pristine land, or greenfields, helps to
curb urban sprawl and promotes "smart growth" or sustainability,u
Federal efforts aimed at brownfields redevelopment have been
diverse and wide-ranging. There have been many programs, but
9. Owen T. Smith, The Expansive Scope of Liable Parties Under CERCLA, 63 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 821 (1989) (generally delineating the scope of liability).
10. 42 U.S.c. §§ 9601(20)(E) & (F), 9607(a).
11. [d. §§ 9601(32), 9607.
12. See supra note 8.
13. Sustainable development can be defined as "the requirement that current
practices not undermine future living standards; present economic systems must main
tain or improve the resource and environmental base, so that future generations will be
able to live as well or better than the present one." William L. Thomas, Rio's Unfin

ished Business: American Enterprise and the Journey Toward Environmentally Sustaina
ble Globalization 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873, 10875 (2002) (quoting MOSTAFA F. TOLBA
& IWONA RUMMEL-BuLSKA, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS FOR THE WORLD: 1973-1992, at 7 (1998». Brownfields
initiatives can be linked to sustainability because they promote revitalization of un
derutilized areas instead of encouraging development on greenfields, which exacerbates
urban sprawl. "Brownfields redevelopment can also promote the 'three Es' of sustaina
ble development by encouraging environmental cleanup and the preservation of green
space, promoting economic competitiveness by building on existing infrastructure and
fostering business expansion, and enhancing social equity by encouraging job creation
in areas that need it most." Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Sustainability Efforts in the
United States: The Progress Since Rio, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10667,10671 (2002); see also
Kermit L. Rader, Congress Passes Landmark Legislation, AB.A SEC. OF ENV'T, EN
ERGY & RESOURCES, at http://www.abanet.org/environ/ programs/teleconference/con
gress.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2003) (noting that "[s]ince redevelopment may avoid
the need to build on currently open land, sometimes called 'greenfields,' encouraging
brownfield redevelopment is also seen as a way to promote 'smart growth''').
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identifying a cohesive program or specialized sub-group is problem
atic. Federal efforts began in 1994 with the EPA's Brownfields Ec
onomic Redevelopment Initiative. 14 The Initiative was designed to
serve several purposes, including: (1) revitalizing urban communi
ties in the Northeast and Midwest through manufacturing and other
industries; (2) preventing unnecessary use of virgin land and re
sources; and (3) relieving increased demand for new manufacturing
and industrial resources by redeveloping brownfields. 15 As ex
plained by the EPA, the Brownfields Economic Redevelopment In
itiative was also designed to "empower the states, cities, tribes,
communities, and other stakeholders in economic redevelopment to
work together in a timely manner to prevent, assess, safely clean up,
and sustainably reuse brownfields. "16
In 1995, the EPA formally announced the Brownfields Action
Agenda to "identify and address the goals of the Brownfields Eco
nomic Redevelopment Initiative."17 The Action Agenda was de
signed to address various identified legal obstacles to brownfields
redevelopment and includes such components as Prospective Pur
chaser Agreements to shield purchasers from environmentalliabil
ity, Memoranda of Agreement with states regarding federal
enforcement efforts on voluntary cleanups, EPA's delisting of sites
from its contaminated sites inventory, and pilot programs and
grants. IS Additional strategies of the Initiative included funding pi
lot program and research efforts, clarifying liability issues, forging
partnerships, conducting outreach activities and training programs,
and addressing environmental justice concerns. 19 To meet identi
fied goals, studies were to be conducted and grants distributed to
redevelop contaminated sites. 20
In 1995 the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council
[hereinafter NEJAC] Waste and Facility Siting Subcommittee and
14. See infra note 16; ELIZABETH GLASS GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDER.
STANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWNFIELD DEVELOPMENT 305 (2000) [herein
after RECYCLING LAND] (noting that then EPA Administrator Carol Browner
announced the federal brownfields initiative in August 1994).
15. RECYCLING LAND, supra note 14, at 306.
16. EPA, BROWNFIELDS ECONOMIC REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE (Oct. 2000)
[hereinafter REDEVELOPMENT INrTIATIVE], at http://www.epa.gov/swerospslbfJabout.
htm.
17. EPA, NEJAC's PUBLIC DIALOGUES ON URBAN REVITALIZATION AND
BROWNFIELDS (April 1997), at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/pdfJdialogue.pdf [here
inafter NEJAC's PUBLIC DIALOGUES]'
18. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at 25-27.
19. NEJAC's PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra note 17.
20. See RECYCLING LAND, supra note 14, at 305-07.
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the EPA held a series of public dialogues to address environmental
justice concerns relating to urban revitalization and brownfields. 21
The NEJAC issued a final report on the dialogues that recom
mended interagency coordination. 22 As a result of this recommen
dation, the EPA organized the Interagency Working Group "as a
forum for Federal agencies to exchange information on
brownfields-related activities and to develop a coordinated national
agenda for addressing brownfields. "23
In 1997 the Interagency Working Group created the
Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda,24 which was de
signed to involve multiple federal agencies and private organiza
tions in the cleanup and reuse of brownfields and to "link more
effectively environmental protection with economic development
and community revitalization programs, and guide the Brownfields
Initiative into the future."25 Partnerships between both public and
private organizations were established to encourage economic de
21. See id.
22. See id.; NEJAC's PUBLIC DIALOGUES, supra note 17.
23. EPA, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON BROWNFIELDS (April
1997), [hereinafter WORKING GROUP ON BROWNFIELDS] at http://www.epa.gov!
brownfields!pdflintragwg.pdf. Multidimensional federal agencies participating in the
Working Group included: the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of
Commerce (DOC), Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Education (ED),
Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of the Interior
(DOl), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Labor (DOL), Department of
Transportation (DOT), Department of the Treasury (Treasury), Department of Veter
ans Affairs (VA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), General Service Administration (GSA), and the Small Business
Administration (SBA). [d.
24. The preamble to the Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda noted
the following laudable purpose:
The Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda is based on the princi
ple that we can assess, clean up and reuse contaminated properties. By linking
environmental protection with economic development and community revital
ization, we look to put in place a sustainable development program that differs
from programs of the past. A program meeting community needs by bringing
public and private organizations together to solve the problem os environmen
tal contamination. The Brownfields National Partnership seeks to protect
public health and the environment by cleaning up contaminated properties,
creating jobs, providing opportunities for private investment and expanding
local economies.
EPA, THE PREAMBLE TO THE BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP ACTION
AGENDA (May 1997) [hereinafter PREAMBLE TO BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PARTNER·
SHIP ACTION AGENDA], at http://www!epa.gov!swerospslbflhtml-doc!aapreamb.htm.
25. WORKING GROUP ON BROWNFIELDS, supra note 23. See also EPA, MEMO
FACILITATING REUSE OF BROWNFIELDS SUBJECT TO THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION
AND RECOVERY ACT: RCRA BROWNFIELDS PREVENTION INITIATIVE (June 11, 1998)
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velopment and environmental protection. 26 This coordination was
designed to promote efficient government and to decrease the like
lihood of duplicative efforts or confusion among programs.27 Mem
oranda of Understanding (MOUs) were to be used between
agencies to create policies and procedures on brownfields
projects. 28 Workforce development was encouraged by the
Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda through educa
tion, training, and the recruitment of students in the environmental
field. 29 Brownfields Showcase Communities were created across
the country to demonstrate the success of the Brownfields Initiative
through public and private cooperation, technical assistance, finan
cial support, and community involvemenpo
Additional pilot projects have taken place across the nation
since 1995. The Brownfields Assessment Demonstration Pilots
awarded fundin:g to explore innovative approaches to the
brownfields problem through redevelopment, removal of regula
tory barriers, and bringing together all affected parties. 3 ! Commu
nities without Brownfields Assessment Demonstration Pilots were
[hereinafter EPA BROWNFIELDS MEMO], at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/rcrabfJpdf/
memo0698.pdf.
26. See EPA, THE BROWNFIELDS NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP AcnON AGENDA
(May 1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS NATURAL PARTNERSHIP AcnON AGENDA], at
http://www.epa. gov./brownfields/pdf/97aa_fs.pdf (noting more than 100 commitments
from more than 25 organizations representing a $300 million investment in brownfields
,
communities and an additional $165 million in loan guarantees).
27. See WORKING GROUP ON BROWNFIELDS, supra note 23 (noting that while
federal and state programs were in existence to address local concerns associated with
brownfields such as unemployment and outdated infrastructure, coordination was nec~
essary to facilitate sustainable redevelopment).
28. Id. The memoranda were designed to "establish policies and procedures be
tween agencies and support projects of mutual interest."
29. See REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 16.
30. EPA, BROWNFIELDS SHOWCASE COMMUNITJES (Oct. 2000), at http://
www.epa.gov/swerosps/bfJpdf/showfact.pdf. The goals of the Showcase Communities
were to:
[1] Promote environmental protection and restoration, economic redevelop
ment, job creation, community revitalization, and public health protection
through the assessment, cleanup, and sustainable reuse of brownfields; [2]
Link federal, state, local, and non-governmental action supporting community
efforts to restore and reuse brownfields; and [3] develop national models dem
onstrating the positive results of public and private collaboration in addressing
brownfields challenges.
Id. "In October 2000 ... 12 Showcase Communities were designated .... includ[ing]
nine federally designated Empowerment ZoneslEnterprise Communities, four small/
rural communities, two tribes, and one Base Realignment and Closure Community."
Id.
31. See REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 16.
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to be assisted through the Targeted Brownfields Assessments pro
gram. 32 Targeted assistance by the EPA included funding and/or
technical assistance to conduct environmental assessments at CER
CLA sites and was designed to supplement other efforts under the
Brownfields Initiatives. 33
The potential liability of organizations involved in brownfields
redevelopment was also acknowledged and addressed through EPA
guidance, Prospective Purchaser Agreements, Comfort/Status Let
ters, and the archiving of many Superfund sites. 34 However, most
of these actions failed to adequately calm the fears of parties relat
ing to Superfund liability.35 Consequently, the Asset Conservation,
Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 1996
[hereinafter Lender Act] was passed and signed into law. 36 The
Lender Act included an amendment on lender liability under CER
CLA, which created a safe harbor for fiduciaries and lenders. 37 The
Lender Act specifically excludes lenders that did not participate in
management from the definition of owner or operator under
CERCLA.38
Up to this point, the EPA mainly focused on CERCLA issues
relating to brownfields. 39 Industries, city representatives, and other
stakeholders began looking beyond CERCLA to comprehensively
address brownfields sites. 40
The RCRA (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act)
Brownfields Prevention Initiative, launched in 1998, targeted
RCRA facilities with the potential for redevelopment, but whose
"reuse or redevelopment ... [was] slowed due to real or perceived
32. [d.
33. EPA, TARGETED BROWNFIELDS ASSESSMENTS (Nov. 1998), at http://
www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdfltba.pdf. Notably, Target Brownfields Assessment fund
ing was only authorized at sites contaminated with hazardous substances, not at sites
contaminated only with petroleum products. [d. Also, funding was not available under
the program where the owner was responsible for the contamination unless there was a
clear means for the EPA to recoup its expenditures. [d.
34. See REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, supra note 16.
35. Samuel R. Staley, Environmental Policy and Urban Revitalization: The Role
of Lender Liability, 25 CAP. U. L .REv. 51 (1996) (discussing affect on lenders ability to
make loans for revitalization).
36. Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).
37. See RECYCLING LAND, supra note 14, at 327 (stating that the lender liability
law protected lenders that engaged in certain specified activities from liability under
CERCLA).
38. See id. at 329 (outlining the categories of exclusion from the law).
39. EPA BROWNFIELDS MEMO, supra note 25.
40.

[d.
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concerns about actual or potential contamination, liability, and
RCRA requirements."41 Under this initiative, the EPA focused on
barriers to brownfields redevelopment presented by RCRA and
worked to develop solutions through the RCRA Brownfields Pre
vention Work Group.42
In 2000, the USTfields Initiative was launched to cleanup pe
troleum contamination from federally regulated underground stor
age tanks.43 "Of the estimated 450,000 brownfields sites in the U.S.,
approximately one-half [were] thought to be impacted by under
ground storage tanks or by some type of petroleum contamina
tion."44 Significantly, other EPA brownfields programs, which
mainly operated under CERCLA, did not cover petroleum contam
ination because petroleum was generally excluded from CER
CLA.4s Consequently, the USTfields Initiative was designed to
facilitate the cleanup of high-priority petroleum-impacted
brownfields sites. 46
Financial incentives also existed to assist the redevelopment of
brownfields. In 1995 the Office of the Comptroller of Currency re
vised its regulations relating to the Community Reinvestment Act 47
to create incentives for economic development in urban areas. 48
Lenders, bankers, and developers could claim loan credits for loans
made to redevelop and cleanup industrial sites. 49 The Taxpayer Re
41. EPA, RCRA Brownfields Prevention Initiative, at http://www.epa.gov/ swer
osps/rcrabf/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
42. See EPA BROWNFIELDS MEMO, supra note 25 (the memo, distributed to se
nior RCRA and CERCLA policy managers, specifically solicited regional participation
on the RCRA Brownfields Prevention Work Group).
43. See EPA, USTfields Initiative Revitalizing Petroleum Contaminated Properties,
at http://www.epa.gov/swerustl/ustfield/index.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2(02) [hereinaf
ter USTfields Initiative] (noting that the initiative was designed to address petroleum
contamination generally excluded from brownfields revitalization programs and "to
take advantage of the many advances in the Brownfields work that and should be ap
plied to the numerous (and often smaller and more rural) USTfields sites").
44. USTfields Initiative, supra note 43.
45. Id.
46. [d. Touted as using "similar problem-solving methods" and relying on "much
of the existing Brownfields infrastructure for implementation," the USTfields Initiative
awarded ten states up to $100,000 each in 2000 and announced an additional forty
USTfields pilots to be awarded in 2002. Id.
47. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.c. §§ 2901-2908 (1977).
48. EPA, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Acr (CRA) (Apr. 1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/swerospslbf/pdf/cra.pdf [hereinafter COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
Acr].
49. [d.; RECYCLING LAND, supra note 14, at 319.
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lief Act of 199750 included the Brownfields Tax Incentive to en
courage the cleanup and redevelopment of both rural and urban
brownfields sites. 51 However, any sites listed or proposed to be
listed on the National Priorities List (NPL) were not eligible for this
tax incentive, which expires in 2003. 52 Clearly, although many ini
tiatives existed to encourage brownfields redevelopment, the pri
mary obstacles continued to be fear of liability and lack of
financing. The 2002 legislation was designed to specifically address
these obstacles.
I.

THE

Acr

As the title of the Act-Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act-suggests, the Act is a union of two
bills. The Senate passed the brownfields revitalization portion of
the legislation by a 99-0 vote on April 25, 2001. 53 The small busi
ness liability portion of the legislation was introduced by the House
as H.R. 1381 and passed the House by a vote of 419-0 on May 22,
2001. Once the bills left their respective chambers they languished
until combined as H.R. 2869. 54 At that point the combined bill
found broad support in both chambers and was signed by President
Bush on January 11, 2002. While much of the media attention fo
cused on the brownfields revitalization provisions (in fact, President
Bush gave little attention to the Superfund reform provisions), the
relationship between the Superfund reform provisions and
brownfields revitalization cannot and should not be overlooked.
The Act consists of two titles. Title I is the Small Business Lia
bility Protection Act55 and provides two primary exemptions from
Superfund liability: one for de minim us contributors56 to Superfund
sites and one for parties contributing only municipal solid waste 57
50. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788 (1997) (codi
fied in scattered sections of 26 U.s.c.) (amended 2000).
51. See EPA, BROWNFIELD TAX INCENTIVE (Aug. 2001), available at http://
www.epa.gov/swerospslbf/bftaxinc.htm [hereinafter BROWNFIELD TAX INCENTIVE]
(noting that the CRA made financing redevelopment property more attractive by pro
viding credit to large lenders while aiding the communities in which the lenders
operated).
52. Id.
53. COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, supra note 2, at xxxv.
54. Id. at xxxv n.2.
55. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-188, § 101, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002).
56. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(0) (2002).
57. Id. § 9607(p).
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to Superfund sites. Title I also addresses expedited settlements,58
limits liability under Superfund based upon ability to pay,59 and
specifically addresses the effect of the new provisions on concluded
actions.60 Title II, the Brownfields Revitalization and Environmen
tal Restoration Act of 2001,61 sets forth provisions relating to
brownfields funding,62 and also addresses certain exemptions from
Superfund liability.63 Further, Title II addresses state response pro
grams,64 creates a bar on federal enforcement actions for sites par
ticipating in state programs,65 and allows the EPA to defer NPL
listing under certain circumstances. 66 NPL sites are considered by
the EPA to represent the greatest threat to health or the
environment.
A.

Primary Superfund Reforms

When signed by President Bush in January 2002, most media
attention devoted to the Small Business Liability Relief and
Brownfields Revitalization Act focused on the brownfields revitali
zation provisions. While these were certainly noteworthy, Title II
of the legislation, focused on Superfund reform, is equally deserv
ing of attention. The new legislation creates four new exemptions67
from Superfund liability and attempts to further clarify the existing
innocent landowner defense.
1.

De Micromis Exemption

Prior to the creation of the de micromis exemption, potentially
responsible parties were unable to raise a defense to liability for
response costs by demonstrating that the material they sent to the
site was so insignificant that it could not have logically caused or
contributed to response costs at the site. 68 Rather, these types of
58. Id. § 9622(g).
59. Id. § 9622(g)(7).
60. Id. § 9607.
61. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Act, Pub. L. No. 107-188,
§ 201, 115 Stat. 2356, 2360 (2002).
62. 42 U.S.c. § 9604(k).
63. Id. § 9604(q).
64. Id. § 9604(k).
65. Id. § 9604(k).
66. Id. § 9622(g)(11).
67. The four new exemptions, discussed infra Parts 1.A.1-.1-.4, include the de
micromis exemption, an exemption for municipal solid waste, a bona fide prospective
purchaser exemption, and an exemption for landowners contiguous to contaminated
property.
68. 42 U.S.c. § 9602 (b) (specifying defenses a party may raise).
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parties had to either settle or demonstrate that costs associated with
their wastes were divisible, an extremely time-consuming,expen
sive, and uncertain endeavor. Section 102 of the Act establishes a
de micromis exemption from potential liability for response costs at
a NPL site for waste generators that can demonstrate that the
amount of waste disposed of at the site was less than 110 gallons of
liquid materials or less than 200 pounds of solid materials. 69 In ad
dition, the party must be able to demonstrate that all or part of the
disposal occurred before April 1, 2001.10 The Act provides that the
de micromis amounts are determined by reference to "the total
amount of the material containing hazardous substances that the
person arranged for disposal ... at the facility" and notes that the
amounts may be modified by EPA regulation.1 1
The de micromis exemption can be lost if the President deter
mines anyone of the following: that the material disposed of by the
generator is contributing or could contribute significantly, either in
dividually or in the aggregate, to the cost of the cleanup; that the
generator has failed to comply with information requests or has im
peded the cleanup; or that the generator has been convicted of a
criminal violation associated with the disposal activity.72 As a prac
tical matter many of these considerations will be difficult to apply.
CERCLA liability actions have avoided the troublesome issues of
causal connection as the joint and several liability scheme obviated
the need for such determinations. The de micromis exemption rein
troduces this difficult proof, particularly in large landfill cases
where the evidence is commingled and it is difficult to demonstrate
the relationship between a particular waste stream and specific re
sponse costs. Notably, any of the aforementioned determinations
by the President are not subject to judicial review. 73
The legislation further modifies the existing Superfund litiga
tion structure by shifting the burden of proof regarding the exemp
tion depending upon the party initiating the action. When the
government sues a party, that party presumably bears the burden of
proving entitlement to the exemption. However, in a contribution
69. Id. § 9607(0)(1)(A).
70. Id. § 9607(0)(1)(B).
71. Id. § 9607(0)(1)(A).
72. Id. § 9607(0)(2).
73. Id. § 9607(0)(3). This provision may give rise to constitutional challenges.
See, e.g., Robert Emmet Hernan & Gordon J. Johnson, The Brownfields and Superfund
Small Business Relief Act: Relief for More Than Small Businesses, 17 NAT'L ENVTL
ENFORCEMENT J., 3,4 (2002) (questioning the constitutionality of the provisions which
isolate presidential decisions under the legislation from judicial review).
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action initiated by a third potentially responsible party (PRP), the
burden of proof shifts to the party initiating the action to show that
the exemption conditions have not been met. 74 Further, and re
markably, where a non-governmental PRP initiates a contribution
action, it will be held liable for the reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees of the de micromis defendant if that defendant is found
not liable. 75 This is a significant departure from the litigation ad
vantage formerly enjoyed by parties initiating Superfund claims.
2.

Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) Exemption

The Act creates a new exemption from arranger liability for
certain parties who arranged for the disposal, transport, or treat
ment of municipal solid waste (MSW) to a NPL site. 76 Prior to the
new exemption, parties that had disposed of only MSW at hazard
ous waste sites complained that site contamination and response
costs were properly attributable to industrial waste generators.
However, strict, joint and several liability formerly attached to the
MSW generators, subject only to their ability to prove that the
harm associated with their waste was divisible from other response
costs. The new MSW exemption covers any owner, operator, or
lessee of residential property; any small business concern and its
parent, subsidiary, or affiliate; and any small charitable tax exempt
organization. 77 For business and charitable organizations, "small"
requires that the entity not have employed more than 100 full-time
individuals during the three taxable years preceding written notice
of potential liability at the site, and that the organization be consid
ered a small business concern within the meaning of the Small Busi
ness Act.7 8
MSW includes any waste material generated by a residential
property.79 It also includes waste generated by a commercial, in
dustrial, or institutional entity if the waste "is essentially the same
as a waste normally generated by a household,"80 "is collected and
74. § 9607(0)(4) (providing that "[i]n the case of a contribution action ... brought
by a party, other than a Federal, State, or local government ... the burden of proof
shall be on the party bringing the action to demonstrate that the conditions [for the de
micromis exemption] are not met").
75. Id. § 9607(p)(7).
76. Id. § 9607(p).
77. Id. § 9607(p)(1).
78. Id. § 9607(p)(1)(B); Small Business Authorization Act, 15 U.S.C. § 631-657(e)
(2000).
79. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(p)(4)(A)(i).
80. Id. § 9607(p)( 4)(A)(ii)(I).
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disposed of with other MSW as part of normal MSW collection ser
vices,"81 and "contains a relative quantity of hazardous substances
no greater than the relative quantity of hazardous substances con
tained in waste material generated by a typical single-family house
hold."82 MSW specifically excludes "combustion ash generated by
resource recovery facilities or municipal incinerators,"83 and "waste
material from manufacturing or processing operations that is essen
tially not the same as waste normally generated by households."84
Like the de micromis exemption, the MSW exemption can be
lost if the President determines that the material sent by the ar
ranger is contributing, or could contribute significantly, either indi
vidually or in the aggregate, to the remedial costs at the NPL site or
that the arranger claiming the exemption has failed to comply with
government requests or is impeding the performance of the re
sponse action. 85 Also, as with the de micromis exemption, such de
terminations by the President are not subject to judicial review. 86
Similar to the de micromis exemption, the MSW exemption
dramatically shifts the burden of proof in Superfund litigation for
parties claiming the exemption. Notably, for waste disposed of
prior to April 1, 2001, the burden of proof regarding the exemption
rests on the party bringing the action, even if that party is the gov
ernment.87 For waste disposed of on or after April 1, 2001, the bur
den to prove application of the exemption falls on the party
claiming the exemption, but only for government-initiated ac
tions. 88 If a third party initiates the action and the waste was dis
posed of on or after April 1, 2001, the burden of proof remains on
the party initiating the contribution action. 89 Also, if a nongovern
mental party brings a contribution action and the defendant suc
cessfully raises the MSW exemption, the nongovernmental party is
liable for the defendant's costs of defending the action, including
reasonable attorney's and expert witness fees. 90 Finally, and most
noteworthy, the MSW exemption explicitly prohibits nongovern
mental contribution actions against owners, operators, or lessees of
81.
82.

[d. § 9607(p)( 4)(A)(ii)(II).
[d. § 9607(p)( 4)(A)(ii)(III).

83.

[d. § 9607(p)(4)(C)(i).
[d. § 9607(p)(4)(C)(ii).
[d. § 9607(p)(2)(A), (B).
[d. § 9607(p)(3).
[d. § 9607(p)(5).
[d. § 9607(p)(5).
[d. § 9607(p)(5).
[d. § 9607(p)(7).

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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residential property.91
3.

Contiguous Property Owners

Under Superfund, property owners located adjacent to con
taminated property could be held liable for contamination that mi
grated to their property. The Act provides a new exemption from
liability for such contiguous property owners so long as the contigu
ous property owner does not contribute to the release and does not
interfere with any response actions on or associated with the con
taminated property.92 To qualify for the exemption, the contami
nated property must be owned by someone other than the
contiguous property owner or anyone affiliated with the contiguous
property owner. 93 In addition, the contiguous property owner must
satisfy certain conditions, including the following:
1) "[T]he landowner must provide full cooperation, assistance,
and access to persons that are authorized to conduct response
actions. "94
2) The landowner must be in "compliance with any land use
restrictions established or relied on in connection with the response
action. "95
3) The landowner must not "impede the effectiveness of any
institutional control employed" at the contaminated property.96
4) The landowner is in compliance with any EPA information
request or subpoena. 97
5) The landowner has "provid[ ed] all required notices with re
spect to the discovery" of the contamination. 98
6) The landowner has "conducted all appropriate inquir[ies]
[at the time the property was acquired and] did not know or have
reason to know that the property was or could be contaminated" as
a result of its proximity to the contaminated property.99
The Act expressly notes that the duty to take reasonable steps
to prevent releases and/or harm does not require the contiguous
property owner to assume responsibility for groundwater investiga
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

9607(p)(1)(A), (p)(6).
9607(q).
9607(1 )(A)(ii).
9607 (q)(l)(A)(iv).
9607 (q)(l)(A)(V)(I).
9607 (q)(l)(A)(V)(II).
9607 (q)(l)(A)(vi).
9607 (q)(l)(A)(vii).
9607(q)(1)(A).

2003] BROWNFlELDS REDEVELOPMENT AND SUPERFUND REFORM

207

tion or remediation, except in accordance with EPA policy.loo The
burden falls upon the contiguous property owner to demonstrate
that it meets the conditions set forth in the exemption,101 but the
Act provides that the EPA may issue an assurance that it will not
take an enforcement action against the contiguous property owner
and/or that it will provide contribution protection to exempt contig
uous property owners.1°2 However, this exemption will not protect
a property owner that knew contamination existed prior to acquir
ing the property, but such a party may otherwise qualify for the
bona fide prospective purchaser defense discussed below.
4.

Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers

The Act provides a defense to Superfund liability for the "bona
fide prospective purchaser" of contaminated property who
purchases after January 11, 2002 (the effective date of the legisla
tion).103 Prospective purchasers can avail themselves of this de
fense if they show that they:
1) acquired the property after the disposal of hazardous
substances·,104
2) made appropriate inquiry regarding the property in accor
dance with certain standards and practices similar to those required
of innocent purchasers discussed below, except that they need not
show that they were not aware that the contamination existed;105
3) completed all required notices associated with the releases
of hazardous substances;106
4) "exercis[ed] appropriate care to stop continuing releases,
prevent[ ed] any threatened future releases, and prevent[ ed] or
limit[ ed] . . . exposure" to previous releases; 107
5) "provid[ ed] full cooperation, assistance, and access to per
sons ... conduct[ing] response actions;"108
6) complied with any applicable institutional controls and any
requests for information;109 and
[d. § 9607(q)(1)(D).
101. [d. § 9607(q)(1)(B).
102. [d. § 9607(q)(3).
103. [d. § 9601(40).
104. /d. § 9601(40)(A).
105. [d. § 9601(40)(B).
106. [d. § 9601(40)(C).
107. [d. § 9601(40)(D).
108. [d. § 9601(40)(E).
109. [d. § 9601(40)(F), (G).
100.
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7) had no affiliation with any responsible party.110
It is noteworthy that this exemption from liability applies even
when the prospective purchaser knows of the existence of contami
nation on the property, as contrasted with the contiguous property
owner exemption and the innocent landowner defense. The ex
emption can be lost if the purchaser impedes the cleanup, fails to
comply with a governmental order, or stops exercising appropriate
care.
One interesting additional component to this exemption is the
governmental windfall lien.1 11 While the prospective purchaser
who qualifies for the defense is not liable for response costs at the
property, the Act allows the federal government to obtain a lien on
the property if the government spends or has spent response costs
in connection with the property and those response costs result in
an increase in the propertY's value.1 12 The lien is limited to the in
crease in value on the property attributable to the cleanup and can
not be recovered by the government until the purchaser sells the
property.113 This windfall lien contradicts in some respects the
Act's provisions which create incentives for brownfields develop
ment. The possibility of a federal lien on a property could be per
ceived as a disincentive both for redevelopers and for lenders. 114
5.

Innocent Landowners

The final protection accorded owners of property under the
new legislation is clarification of the existing innocent landowner
defense under CERCLA.1 15 The CERCLA defense had provided
owners protection against liability where they could show that they
did not know the property was contaminated at the time of
110. Id. § 9601(40)(H).
111. Id. § 9607(r).
112. Id. § 9607(r)(2).
113. Id. § 9607(r)(3).
114. See William S. Hatfield, The Brownfields Revitalization and Environmental
Restoration Act of 2001: Two New Defenses to CERCLA Liability-Do They Accom
plish the Goals of Congress?, 14 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., No.6, at 3 (June 2002).
The author noted that:
More problematic ... is that the windfall lien provision creates new uncertain
ties and risks for financial institutions that historically have been skittish when
lending on properties that have environmental risk. This trade-off by Con
gress does not appear to be well reasoned if the purpose of the Brownfield
amendments was to remove uncertainty and to provide incentives to the
marketplace.
Id.
115. See 42 U.S.c. § 9601(35)(A).
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purchase despite having conducted "all appropriate inquiries" into
the past and present uses of the property.1 16 Prior to the passage of
the new law, there was no standard definition of what constituted
an appropriate inquiry and courts were left to determine under
what circumstances a property owner could meet the condition of
the defense. The Act corrects this deficiency by requiring the EPA
to adopt regulations that clearly identify what must be done to sat
isfy the standard.11 7 In addition, the Act sets forth criteria the EPA
should consider in adopting those regulations, including the results
of an inquiry by environmental professionals, interviews with past
and present owners, reviews of historical sources, and searches of
environmental liens. 118
The Act also provides interim standards which are based upon
the date of purchase. For property purchased before May 31, 1997,
the court, in addressing the application of the defense, will take into
account such factors as the specialized knowledge or experience of
the defendant, the purchase price of the property, commonly
known or obvious information about the property, and the ability
of the defendant to detect the contamination by appropriate inspec
tion. 119 For property purchased on or after May 31, 1997, the Act
requires compliance with the American Standard for Testing and
Materials (ASTM) procedures, including the standard entitled Stan
dard Practice for Environmental Site Assessment: Phase I Environ
mental Site Assessment Process. 120 For residential property, the
defense may be demonstrated on the basis of a facility inspection
and title search that reveal no basis for further investigation. 121
The standards include the same reasonable steps required of
other owner exemptions under the Act, including the requirement
that the owner prevent continuing or future releases, prevent or
limit exposure to past releases, and provide full cooperation and
access to individuals involved in response actions. 122 Clearly the
prospective purchaser and innocent landowner defenses are critical
new components to brownfields redevelopment. Because parties
were formerly subject to CERCLA liability on the basis of owner
ship alone and without regard to fault, fear of liability based on
116.
117.
118.
119.

120.
121.
122.

§ 9601 (B)(i)(J).
§ 9601(35)(B)(ii).
§ 9601(35)(B)(iii).
§ 9601(35)(B)(iv)(J).
[d. § 9601(35)(B)(iv)(II).
[d. § 9601(35)(B)(v).
[d. § 9601(35)(B)(i)(II); see supra notes 92 and 107-08.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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taking ownership of brownfields greatly impeded redevelopment.
The relaxation or removal of this legal obstacle should therefore
encourage the reuse of such property.
B.

Expedited Settlements

The Act further clarifies the EPA's expedited settlement pro
cess. Parties that can demonstrate an inability or limited ability to
pay are eligible for a reduction in settlement or alternative payment
methods. 123 In determining whether a party has demonstrated an
inability to pay, the President will consider "the ability of the per
son to pay response costs and still maintain its basic business opera
tions, including consideration of the overall financial condition of
the person and demonstrable constraints on the ability of the per
son to raise revenues."124 As a condition to the settlement, the set
tling party must waive all claims against other potentially
responsible parties for response costs incurred at the site, including
claims for contribution, unless the President makes a determination
that requiring a waiver would be unjust.1 25 A party will not be eligi
ble for the settlement reduction "if the President determines that
the . . . party has failed to comply with any request for access or
information ... or has impeded or is impeding, through action or
inaction, the performance of a response action with respect to the
facility."126 Also, notwithstanding the settlement, the party remains
obligated to provide access and information requested in connec
tion with the response actions. 127 Determinations by the President
regarding eligibility for the settlement or the waiver requirement
are not subject to judicial review.1 28 It will be interesting to moni
tor how this lack of judicial review for expedited settlements inter
acts with the other provisions in CERCLA that allow judicial
oversight of consent decrees. 129
123. See § 9622(g)(7).
124. Id. § 9622(g)(7)(B).
125. Id. § 9622(g)(8)(A).
126. [d. § 9622(g)(8)(B).
127. Id. § 9622(g)(8)(C).
128. Id. § 9622(g)(1l).
129. One author observes that "[t]his new [limitation on judicial review] likely
will be used by the government to further impose orphan shares on other viable poten
tially responsible parties." Jay A. Jaffe & Thomas F. Quinn, CERCLA Amendment
Creates New Exemptions and Defenses. Protects Against Liability for Cleanup Costs,
Encourages Redevelopment of Brownfields, N.J.L.J. Feb. 25,2002, at 679-81.
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Effect on Concluded Actions

Section 103 of Title I, the Small Business Liability Protection
Act, provides that the amendments in "this title" shall not apply to
or affect any settlement or judgment issued by a United States Dis
trict Court or any administrative settlement or order entered into or
issued by the United States that are issued before the date of the
enactment of the Act.130 Consequently, the de micromis and MSW
exemptions found in Title I cannot be used to upset any of the
aforementioned settlements, judgments, or orders. However, it is
not clear what affect the contiguous property owner and bona fide
prospective purchaser exemptions and the clarifications to the inno
cent purchaser defense may have on past settlements, judgments, or
orders.
.
D.

Additions to the NPL

CERCLA is amended to allow a state to request a deferral of
the NPL listing when the state, or a party under agreement with the
state, is conducting a response action at a site in compliance with a
response program.B 1 The EPA should generally defer to the state's
request, provided that either the response action conducted pursu
ant to a state program is providing long-term protection of human
health and the environment, or that the state is actively pursuing an
agreement that will assure that form of a response action.132 The
EPA may list the site after one year if the EPA determines that the
site is not making reasonable progress in completing the response
action.133 If the site is one in which the state is pursuing a clean up
agreement, the EPA may either list the site on the NPL after one
year, or it may defer the listing for an additional 180 days if such a
deferral is warranted on the basis of the complexity of the site or
evidence of substantial progress on the negotiations.1 34 The EPA
may decline deferral of a listing if the state is an owner or operator
of the site, is a significant contributor of hazardous substances to
the site, or if conditions sufficient to issue a health advisory with
respect to the site have been met. 135
130. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-118, § 118, 115 Stat. 2356, 2360 (2002).
131. 42 U.S.c. § 9605(h)(1)(A) (2002).
132. [d. § 9605(h)(1).
133. [d. § 9605(h)(2).
134. !d. § 9605(h)(3).
135. [d. § 9605(h)(4).
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Brownfields Initiatives

Title II of the Act is titled Brownfields Revitalization and En
vironmental Restoration Act of 2001.136 This title contains the pri
mary brownfields initiatives as well as Superfund reforms relating
to contiguous property owners,137 bona fide prospective purchas
ers,13s and clarifications to the innocent purchaser defense 139 dis
cussed above. While the EPA has had various brownfields
programs for years, the Act represents the federal government's
most significant effort to date to address the brownfields problem.
The brownfields sections of the Act address (1) the definition of a
brownfield,140 (2) federal grants and loans available to state and lo
cal governments to investigate and remediate brownfields,141 (3)
state response programs,142 and (4) limitations on federal enforce
ment relating to sites remediated under state response programs.143
Brownfields Definition

1.

Section 211(a) of the Act sets forth the new CERCLA defini
tion of a brownfields site. 144 A brownfields site is defined as "real
property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous
substance, pollutant or contaminant."145 The definition includes
mine-scarred land 146 and sites that are contaminated by petroleum
when the contamination is of low risk and the site has no other
responsible party to complete the cleanup.147 This apparently very
broad definition is then significantly limited by enumerated exclu
sions. The following properties are excluded from the definition of
a brownfields site:
(i) a facility that is the subject of a planned or ongoing re
moval action . . . ;
136. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Act, Pub. L. No. 107·188,
§ 201, 115 Stat. 2356, 2360 (2002).
137. 42 U.S.c. § 9607(q).
138. Id. § 9601(40).
139. Id. § 9601(35).
140. Id. § 9601(39).
141. Id. § 9604(k)(3).
142. Id. §§ 9601(41),9628.
143. Id. § 9628(b).
144. Id. § 9601(39)(A).

145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(III).
/d. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II).
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(ii) a facility that is listed on the National Priorities List or: is
proposed for listing;
(iii) a facility that is the subject of a unilateral administrative
order, a court order, an administrative order on consent or
judicial consent decree that has been issued to or entered
into [under CERCLA] ... ;
(iv) a facility that is the subject of a unilateral administrative
order, a court order, an administrative order on consent or
judicial consent decree that has been issued to or entered
into [under RCRA, the CWA, TSCA or the Safe Drinking
Water Act] ... ;
(v) a facility that [is subject to corrective action under RCRA]
... ,
(vi) a [facility classified as a hazardous waste] land disposal unit
...,
(vii) [a federal facility] ... ;
(viii) [a facility contaminated by polychlorinated biphenyl] ... ;
and
(ix) a ... facility [that has received funds] ... from the Leaking
Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund .... 148

However, the President may choose to provide assistance to
sites excluded from the grant program under (i), (iv), (v), (viii), or
(ix) if the President finds that the funding will "protect human
health and the environment, and either promote economic develop
ment or enable the creation of, preservation of, or addition to
parks, greenways, undeveloped property, other recreational prop
erty, or other property used for nonprofit purposes."149 Because
the Act only provides funding for brownfields sites, one must care
fully consider this complex definition to determine whether the site
in question is properly classified as a brownfield.
2.

Revitalization Funding

The Act provides sections relating to brownfields revitalization
funding for eligible entities. 150 These eligible entities include state
and local governments, tribes, governmental entities or redevelop
ment agencies established by state governments, regional councilor
groups of general purpose units of local government, land clearance
authority, or other quasi-governmental entities that operate under
the supervision and control of local government, and certain enti
148.
149.
150.

[d. § 9601(39)(B).
[d. § 9601(39)(C).
[d. § 9604(k).
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ties defined under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.1 51
The brownfields Act then directs the EPA to establish two pro
grams, one to provide grants to "inventory, characterize, assess, and
conduct planning related to brownfields sites"152 and one to pro
vide grants and loans for brownfields remediation. 153
Grants issued under the Brownfield Site Characterization and
Assessment Grant program may be awarded to an "eligible entity
on a community-wide or site-by-site-basis, and shall not exceed, for
an individual brownfield site ... $200,000."154 However, the EPA
Administrator can waive this limitation and provide a characteriza
tion and assessment grant of not more than $350,000 if warranted
by the site's anticipated level of contamination, size, or status of
ownership.155
Grants and loans issued for brownfields remediation may be
used by the eligible entity directly for remediation or to capitalize
revolving loan funds. 156 Grants for remediation are awarded based
on specified factors, which include: (1) the extent to which the grant
will facilitate the creation or preservation of parks, greenways, un
developed or recreational property or property used for nonprofit
purposes; (2) the extent to which the grant is justified by the needs
in a community that limited alternative sources of funding for envi
ronmental remediation and redevelopment; and (3) the extent to
which the grant facilitates the use or reuse of existing infrastruc
ture. 157 Similar to grants under the Site Characterization and As
sessment Program, grants may be awarded on a community-wide or
site-by-site basis and may not exceed $1,000,000 per eligible en
tity.1 58 The Administration may issue additional grants based on
the following factors: the number of sites and communities ad
dressed by the revolving loan fund; the demand for funding by eligi
ble entities that have not previously received a grant; the
demonstrated ability of the eligible entity to use the revolving loan
fund for remediation and continued funding purposes; and other
factors the Administrator deems appropriate to further the pur
151. Id. § 9604(k)(1); Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 43 U.S.c.
§ 1629(b)-1629(e)(2000); 30 U.S.c. § 1702 (Supp. 2002).
152. 42 U.S.c. § 9604(k)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 2002).
153. Id. § 9604(k)(3).
154. Id. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(i)(I).
155. ld. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(i)(II).
156. ld. § 9604(k)(3)(A)(i).
157. ld. § 9604(k)(3)(C).
158. ld. § 9604(k)(4)(A)(ii).
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poses of the program.159
The Act provides instruction on grant applications 160 and es
tablishes a system to be used by the EPA to rank applications for
grants. 161 Ranking criteria under the Act include factors such as:
the ability of the entity to receive other funding sources and the
extent to which a grant under the program might stimulate such
alternative funding; the potential of the proposed project to stimu
late economic development or to create or preserve parks, green
ways, and recreational property; the extent to which the grant
would address threats to human health and the environment or to
otherwise sensitive or disadvantaged populations; the extent to
which the grant facilitates the use or reuse of existing infrastructure;
and the extent to which the grant furthers the fair distribution of
funding between rural and urban areas. 162
No part of a grant or loan under these programs may be used
to pay penalties, fines, or administrative costs or response costs for
which a party is liable under CERCLA.163 However, grants and
loans may be used to pay for costs associated with the identification
and investigation of the extent of contamination, the design and
performance of a response action, or the monitoring of a natural
resource. l64 Also, a portion of the grant may be used to purchase
insurance for the characterization, assessment, or remediation of a
site. 165 Local governments may not use more than ten percent of
the grant funds for programs that monitor the health of populations
exposed to a brownfields site or to monitor and enforce institu
tional controls used to prevent human exposure to a hazardous sub
stance at a brownfields site. 166
3.

State Response Programs

Under section 231 of the Act, states and tribes that have quali
fied response programs are eligible for grants to either enhance the
response program,167 capitalize a revolving fund for brownfields
remediation,168 or purchase insurance or develop a risk sharing
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

[d.
[d.
/d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
/d.

§ 9604(k)(5)(A).
§ 9604 (k)(5)(C).

§ 9604(k)(4)(B)(i).
§ 9604(k)(5)(B)(ii).
§ 9604(k)(4)(D).
§ 9604(k)(4)(C).
§ 9628(a)(I)(B)(i).
[d. § 9628(a)(I)(B)(ii)(I).
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pool for financing response action under the response program. 169
The authorization for appropriation of funds under the state re
sponse program grant initiative is $50,000,000 for each fiscal year
between 2002 and 2006. 170
To qualify for a grant, the state must demonstrate that its re
sponse program includes certain elements or that it is taking rea
sonable steps to incorporate the elements into its program. l71
There are four primary elements the program must include. First,
the program must require a timely survey and inventory of
brownfields sites in the state. l72 Second, the program must include
oversight and enforcement authorities or mechanisms to ensure
that response actions will protect human health and the environ
ment and will be conducted in accordance with applicable law. 173
The enforcement authorities or mechanisms must also ensure that
persons conducting the response actions complete all necessary re
sponse activities, including long-term monitoring activities. 174
Third, the state response program must provide sufficient opportu
nity for public participation, including public access to documents,
as well as notice and opportunity for comment on proposed site
activities. 175 Finally, the state response program must provide a
mechanism for approval of cleanup plans and the requirement that
a response action, once complete, is verified and certified by the
state, tribe, or a licensed site professional.1 76
4.

Enforcement Limitation

One of the most closely watched aspects of the legislation con
cerned the bar on EPA enforcement actions on properties partici
pating in state voluntary cleanup programs.1 77 Many states and
most development interests demanded federal enforcement protec
tion for parties undergoing voluntary cleanups pursuant to state
Id. § 9628(a)(1)(B)(ii)(II).
Id. § 9628(a)(3).
171. Id. § 9628(a)(1)(A)(I).
172. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(A).
173. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(B)(i).
174. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(B)(ii).
175. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(C).
176. Id. § 9628(a)(2)(D).
177. In fact, the Senate Committee Report noted, "Despite protection from State
liability as an incentive to invest in these [brownfield] types of sites, testimony before
the committee confirmed that fear of incurring Federal liability sometimes drives devel
opers and lenders toward open spaces." S. REP. No. 107-2, at 3 (2001).
169.
170.
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programs. Contrary concerns addressed how to respond to inade
quate cleanups. The Act addresses both concerns.
The Act provides that federal enforcement is barred at eligible
response sites where a release or threatened release is being ad
dressed by a response action "in compliance with the State program
that specifically governs response actions for the protection of
human health and the environment."178 There are several enumer
ated exceptions to the enforcement bar. The EPA can bring an ad
ministrative or judicial enforcement action during or after the
completion of a response action if (1) the state requests assistance,
(2) the EPA determines that contamination has migrated or will mi
grate across a state line or onto federal property, (3) the EPA deter
mines that the release or threatened release may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to public health or the en
vironment and that additional response actions are therefore neces
sary, or (4) the EPA determines that certain information about the
site was previously unknown and such information gives rise to ad
ditional remedia tion.179
The enforcement bar is not effective unless the state compiles a
public record inventorying a record of sites by name and location,
which have undergone or are contemplating response actions pur
suant to the state program.180 The record must be updated annually
and must include certain information about the sites, including any
use restriction or institutional controls at the site. 181 Generally, if
the EPA intends to initiate enforcement proceedings pursuant to an
eligible response site, it must first notify the state and give the state
an opportunity to reply.182 The enforcement bar does not preclude
the EPA from recovering costs incurred prior to the enactment of
the AcU 83 Moreover, the legislation does not modify or otherwise
affect memoranda of agreement, memoranda of understanding, or
similar agreements between state and federal government in effect
prior to the enactment of the legislation. l84
II.

COMMENTS

The brownfields initiatives create both incentives and risks for
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

42 U.S.c. § 9628(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2002).
!d. § 9628(b)(1)(B).
ld. § 9628(b)(1)(C).
!d.
!d. § 9628(b)(1)(D).
!d. § 9628(b)(2)(A).
ld. § 9628(b)(2)(B).
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developers.. Aside from the authorization for funds, most of the
brownfields initiatives contained in the legislation are not new
they merely build on enforcement policies and pilot programs de
veloped by the federal government in the last several years. How
ever, there now is clear congressional authorization for those
programs. Presumably this will enhance the profile and further en
courage brownfields redevelopment. Moreover, the explicit en
forcement bar may provide encouragement to developers whose
primary resistance was fear or uncertainty of federalliability.185
The funding authorizations, while significant, should be closely
examined. Authorizations for funding do not guarantee that the
money will actually be appropriated. Indeed, while the legislation
authorizes up to $250 million per year for the next five fiscal years,
President Bush asked Congress to appropriate only $200 million for
brownfields redevelopment in fiscal year 2003. While this is a sig
nificant increase over former funding levels, it is not the full amount
authorized under the legislation,186 Also, while the legislation
clearly envisions the federal government to defer to state
brownfields programs, the EPA retains considerable discretion on
many important issues. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the
brownfields initiatives, both those relating to funding and to federal
involvement, improve actual redevelopment efforts.
When the legislation was announced, much attention was fo
cused on the brownfields provisions. The impact of the Superfund
reforms should not be underestimated. Four new categories of for
merly PRPs have effectively been carved out of contribution ac
tions. The exemptions and shifting burdens of proof will likely have
a great impact on remaining PRPs. It is worth noting that the ex
empt categories-de micromis, MSW, bona fide prospective pur
chasers, and contiguous property owners-were never the big
players in massive Superfund lawsuits. The exclusion of these par
ties from the pool of PRPs may help facilitate settlement by the
bigger parties, but only if the definitions provided by the legislation
prove clear enough to avoid further complicating the litigation
185. It is worth noting that the enforcement bar provides little concrete protec
tion. The EPA has rarely initiated enforcement proceedings against parties actively
participating in a voluntary response program. Nonetheless, the uncertainty regarding
such exposure was a real impediment to redevelopment projects.
186. See Channing J. Martin, Congress Provides Superfund Liability Relief, VA.
ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE, Apr. 2002, at 5 (noting that the $250 million authorized
for each of fiscal years 2002 through 2006 is a $150 million increase over current funding
but that authorization does not ensure that the funds will be appropriated).
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nightmare that is CERCLA.1 87 In sum, while the exemptions ap
pear to provide considerable relief to certain parties, considerable
ambiguities exist that will likely give rise to additional litigation.
While environmental law is largely perceived to be a field
fraught with partisan stalemates, it is no surprise that this legislation
received bipartisan support and was passed by the Bush Adminis
tration. This is true, notwithstanding criticisms of the environmen
tal record of the Administration. 188 While certain aspects clearly
support environmentalism, developers and industry benefit from
enhanced support for brownfields development. Also, the legisla
tion provides more protection to private parties under CERCLA.
The clarifications to owner liability should also have a favorable
affect on real estate transactions. 189
Clearly, some of the provisions could have further encouraged
redevelopment. 19o As far as the Bush Administration is concerned,
however, the legislation should be perceived as an environmental
success. CERCLA reform is long overdue and this legislation
187. As one commentator notes: "The Act is a step in the right direction, but one
could ask of Congress, 'With friends like these, who needs enemies?'" Martin,supra
note 186, at 6. The author concludes that while the new Superfund defenses are compli
cated and therefore difficult to prove, the Act is a "long-awaited step in the right direc
tion to reforming what is clearly the most unfair law Congress has ever enacted." Id.;
see also Thomas O. McGarity, Jogging In Place: The Bush Administration's Freshman
Year Environmental Record, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10709 (2002) (noting that "the [Bush]
Administration participated actively in the enactment of long-pending 'brownfields'
legislation that will devote additional federal funds ... to help clean up contaminated
urban sites and thereby promote redevelopment of inner city areas").
188. While the Act was passed under a Republican administration and received
noteworthy bipartisan support, it should be acknowledged that the provisions are not a
result of pure Bush Administration initiatives. As noted, the Act merely formalizes
and, in some cases, expands on EPA enforcement policy prior to the date of the Act.
See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 187 (noting that the brownfields legislation cannot be
"properly characterized as a Bush Administration 'initiative'" and the author was "una
ble to identify a single important new rulemaking initiative undertaken by the Bush
Administration to protect citizens from private polluting activities that was not in the
works prior to January 20, 2001 ").
189. See, e.g., AMY L. EDWARDS, AM. LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS'N COURSE OF
STUDY 97 (2002) (noting that, as a result of the Act, "interested parties are now able to
evaluate environmental risk in a rational manner, rather than blindly abandoning even
mildly contaminated properties ... [with a result] ...that is good for the environment,
good for the community, and good for business").
190. As one author notes, "These changes have been a long time in development.
They [ ] are not as sweeping as had been expected during the last initiative to modify
Superfund during the Clinton years. However ... [the Act] is a step, albeit a small and
quiet one, in the right direction." Ann M. Catino, Superfund Reform Exempts Entities.
New Law is a Small, Quiet Step in the Direction of Superfund Reform, CONN. L. TRIB
UNE, Feb. 25, 2002, at 2.
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makes certain favorable strides. Moreover, any steps to encourage
brownfields redevelopment certainly benefit the environment and
help to quell urban sprawl. The legislation can be characterized as
a small, but timely, step toward brownfields redevelopment and, ul
timately, sustainable development,191

191. Nations from around the world recently convened in Johannesburg to dis
cuss issues relating to sustain ability. This summit followed up on sustain ability discus
sions by world leaders in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. A central idea behind sustainable
development is that goals of social equity, economic growth, and environmental protec
tion should be considered while planning for the future. Jonathan D. Weiss, Local Sus
tainability Efforts in the United States: The Progress Since Rio, 32 ENVfL. L. REp.
10667, 10667 (2002) (adding that "[i]n the United States, policies promoting sus
tainability have arisen most often out of concerns about the effects of sprawl and thus
most sustain ability practices have been increasingly referred to as 'smart growth' ").
The brownfields initiatives contained in the Act can properly be characterized as an
effort, albeit small and quiet, toward "smart growth," or sustainability. See, Catino,
supra note 190, at 2. The legislation was therefore timely insofar as the world's nations
reconvened in September 2002, in Johannesburg to revisit the sustain ability agenda set
forth in Rio.

